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STATEMENT OF CONSENT

Both parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief. No party or
party’s counsel authored or paid for this brief.
II.

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI

The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy (“Warren
Institute”) is a research center within Berkeley Law School, funded principally
from research grants from Boalt Hall alumni. The Warren Institute is a
multidisciplinary venture to produce research-based policy prescriptions on the
most challenging issues facing the Nation, including civil rights and education.
The Warren Institute’s mission is to engage the most difficult topics in a wide
range of legal and public policy subject areas.
The Anti-Defamation League (“ADL”) was founded a hundred years ago, in
1913, to combat anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination, and to secure
justice and fair treatment for all. As part of its work, ADL advocates for equal
educational opportunity by seeking ways to close racial and ethnic disparities in
educational outcomes.
III.

BACKGROUND AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Warren Institute and ADL submit this brief urging reversal because the
district court failed to consider an animus theory of equal protection. Under this
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theory, the State exhibited unconstitutional and irrational animus against the
Tucson Unified School District’s Mexican American Studies community by
singling it out as the only group to have its cultural heritage classes banned. As
explained below, the necessary inquiry into unconstitutional animus is highly factdependent, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment sua sponte.
Because this appeal asks the Court to “review a grant of summary judgment,
[the Court] view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to [Plaintiffs], the
nonmoving party, and accept[s] all disputed facts most favorable to [them].”
Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1054 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). Pursuant
to that standard, Amici agree with the facts laid out in Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief,
and present only those facts relevant to Amici’s argument. Similarly, Amici agree
with Plaintiffs’ other equal protection arguments.
A.

The Origins of the Mexican American Studies Program in Tucson
Unified School District.

In 1974, a group of Hispanic and black students sued Tucson Unified School
District (“TUSD”) in federal court “alleging intentional segregation and
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.” Fisher v.
Tucson Unified School District, 652 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011). In 1978 the
District Court for Arizona entered a consent decree that has governed TUSD ever
since. Id. See also Fisher v. Lohr, No. CV 74-90-TUC-DCB, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb.
-283318-0001/LEGAL28479297.1
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6, 2013) (memorandum order) (“Deseg. Order”) (collectively the “Desegregation
Case”). The consent decree required that the school district meet its “affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Deseg. Order at
*2 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A key part of TUSD’s
“affirmative duty” included eliminating unequal academic opportunities for
minority students. Id. at *3.
To facilitate its efforts to desegregate its schools and address achievement
gaps for its minority students, TUSD established four programs to provide
culturally responsive curricula: African American Studies, Mexican American
Studies (“MAS”), Native American Studies, and Pan Asian Studies. The impetus
for these programs was the belief that providing classes that emphasize the cultural
and historical accomplishments of various ethnicities, would help these students
achieve the same challenging state standards as all other students.
Under almost every measure, the MAS program was a resounding success.
During a six-year period, 2005-2010, Hispanic students who took an MAS course
had a cumulative graduation rate that was 7.7% higher than their comparison
group, Hispanic students who did not take an MAS course. ER 2244. Better still,
that rate was getting progressively better: in 2010 the graduation rate for MAS
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students was 10.9% higher than their non-MAS peers. ER 2244. Likewise, MAS
students performed substantially better on state tests. During that same six-year
stretch, MAS students had a 12% higher passage rate on the state reading test than
the comparison group, and an 11.2% higher passage rate on the state writing test.
ER 2242. In short, to the extent MAS was designed to promote student
achievement amongst traditionally disadvantaged students with high dropout rates
and low test scores, MAS was working.
And yet, despite the MAS program’s successful track record in eliminating
the achievement gap and promoting graduation rates for Hispanic students in
TUSD, a growing number of State officials, including the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction sought to end the program based on anecdotal stories about
members of Tucson’s MAS community.
B.

Targeting the Mexican American Studies Community of Tucson
Unified School District, the Arizona Legislature Enacted A.R.S. §
15-112.

In 2006, an assembly at Tucson High School erupted into controversy when
a guest speaker, Dolores Huerta, a longtime civil rights leader, stated that
“Republicans hate Latinos.” ER 1054-55. The backlash was immediate and
Arizona’s then-Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Horne dispatched his
Deputy Superintendent, Margaret Garcia-Gugan, to rebut Huerta’s statement. Id.
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During Garcia-Gugan’s speech, a group of students staged a silent demonstration,
taping their mouths shut to symbolize their silence because the students were not
permitted to ask any questions. Id. After the speech, the students walked out in
silence. Id. Horne publicly decried the students’ protest as “disrespectful,” and
blamed Tucson’s MAS community for the students’ actions, claiming that the
MAS program taught them to behave this way. ER 1056-57. Horne then
published an “Open Letter” to Tucson blaming the MAS program for fostering
“racial resentment” within the Mexican American community, and revealing his
commitment to end Tucson’s MAS program. ER 1054-58.
Despite Horne’s letter vilifying the MAS program, TUSD continued the
popular and successful program. Frustrated by its perseverance, Horne shifted his
efforts to the legislature. Arizona’s House Bill 2281 (“H.B. 2281”), which Horne
supported, sought to ban Tucson’s MAS program. Now codified as A.R.S. § 15112, the law prohibits state school districts from providing courses that (1)
“promote the overthrow of the United States government,” (2) “promote
resentment toward a race or class of people,” (3) “are designed primarily for pupils
of a particular ethnic group,” and (4) “advocate ethnic solidarity instead of
treatment of pupils as individuals.” A.R.S. § 15-112(A). Under the law, the State
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Superintendent of Public Instruction is empowered to order that noncompliant
programs be changed or dismantled. Id. § 15-112(B).
The State acknowledges that A.R.S. § 15-112 “was passed in response to
complaints about the MAS program. Indeed, the testimony before the Senate
Committee confirms that this was the case.” ER 27. Then-Superintendent Horne
testified before the Senate and House committees considering H.B. 2281, and his
testimony focused entirely on Tucson’s MAS program. See id. (noting that when
“Horne’s informal effort failed, he became the driving force behind the enactment
of [H.B. 2281],” and that Horne “stated unequivocally that his support for [H.B.
2281] arose from his concerns about the MAS program”). Horne’s efforts paid off
when the legislature passed the bill, and Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed it on
May 10, 2010. The law’s effective date was January 1, 2011, the day after Horne’s
tenure as Superintendent would end.
When the law passed, the TUSD School Board immediately adopted a
resolution requiring compliance with the law and conducted training sessions for
MAS instructors. ER 1117. Despite those efforts, and months before the law’s
effective date, then-Superintendent Horne ordered the MAS program investigated
for potential violations. On his last day in office, and one day before the law took
effect, Horne released a finding that Tucson’s MAS program was in violation of

-683318-0001/LEGAL28479297.1

Case: 13-15657

11/25/2013

ID: 8877119

DktEntry: 21-2

Page: 12 of 42

A.R.S. 15-112. ER 27. The timing of Horne’s decision “means that Horne
necessarily applied the statute retroactively, without any effort to show that the
problematic materials were in use at the time of the Finding.” ER. 27. Horne
unequivocally declared that the program could not be fixed, and that it had to be
banned in its entirety. ER 2184. In that same letter, Horne acknowledged that
other programs “could be found in violation” of the law, but did nothing to
investigate those programs. ER 28.
Horne’s successor as State Superintendent of Public Instruction continued
Horne’s crusade against Tucson’s MAS community. On January 1, 2011, former
State Senator John Huppenthal, a key supporter of A.R.S. § 15-112 while he was in
the state legislature, succeeded Horne as State Superintendent. Acknowledging
that Horne’s investigation and findings were legally dubious, Superintendent
Huppenthal ordered his own investigation of Tucson’s MAS program. ER 28;
1257. As part of that investigation, the State hired Cambium Learning, Inc., to
audit Tucson’s MAS program (“Cambium Audit”). ER 1257. The Cambium
auditors collected curriculum material, visited classrooms to observe teaching
methods and student behavior, and evaluated TUSD’s data on test scores and
graduation rates. ER 2266. The Cambium Audit made three key findings. First,
the auditors concluded that the MAS program did not violate A.R.S. § 15-112.
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Second, the auditors “found the courses to be rigorous and that students were held
to high standards of performance.” Deseg. Order at *15; see also ER 2229. And
finally, the auditors analyzed data on test scores and graduation rates of MAS and
non-MAS students, and concluded that the MAS program was substantially
responsible for narrowing the achievement gap for Hispanic students enrolled in
the program. ER 2247.
Even though it commissioned the report, Superintendent Huppenthal’s office
immediately sought to discredit the Cambium Audit. However, the Special Master
appointed by the district court in the Desegregation Case later commissioned his
own study, the “Cabrera Report,” which reached similar conclusions about the
program’s effectiveness. Deseg. Order at *15. But all the data that showed the
MAS program promoted academic achievement and helped close the achievement
gap for Hispanic students in TUSD—even the data in the State’s own audit—
would not be enough to save the program. On June 15, 2011, Superintendent
Huppenthal issued a terse three-page finding that Tucson’s MAS program violated
A.R.S. § 15-112 because its classes (1) promoted racial resentment, (2) were
designed primarily for Hispanic students, and (3) promoted ethnic solidarity rather
than individuality. ER 2194-96.
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Though the State concedes that other ethnic studies programs violate A.R.S.
§ 15-112, “[t]o date, no other programs have been investigated or found to be in
violation of [A.R.S. § 15-112].” ER 28. In short, the Mexican American Studies
community in Tucson is the only group whose cultural heritage program has been
targeted, investigated, and dismantled by the State pursuant to A.R.S. § 15-112.
C.

Plaintiffs Challenge the Constitutionality of A.R.S. § 15-112, But
the District Court Prematurely Grants Summary Judgment to the
State.

After the Superintendent declared Tucson’s MAS program dismantled,
Plaintiffs filed this action alleging that A.R.S. § 15-112 violates several
constitutional principles, including over breadth, vagueness, and equal protection.
ER 2150. On October 21, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on
its claims that A.R.S. § 15-112 is unconstitutionally broad and vague. ER 2034.
Plaintiffs did not move for summary judgment on their equal protection claims.
The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ over breadth
and vagueness claims, but did not move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim. ER 472; 1387. See also ER 8 (district court acknowledging that
neither party briefed equal protection at the summary judgment stage).
The district court granted in part, and denied in part, both parties’ motions
for summary judgment. Specifically, the district court denied all of Plaintiffs’
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vagueness and over breadth challenges, except with respect to § 15-112(A)(3),
which barred classes designed primarily for one ethnic group. The district court
concluded that provision was unconstitutionally overbroad. ER 20. Instead of
stopping there, however, the district court went on to grant the State summary
judgment, sua sponte, on Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. ER 24-30.
Because neither party moved for summary judgment on the equal protection
claims, the district court first had to determine which equal protection theories it
would apply to Plaintiffs’ claim. The court considered only two theories: (1)
whether the law facially discriminates against Hispanics under the “political
structure” theory of discrimination, as outlined in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969), Washington v. Seattle School District, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), and Valeria v.
Davis, 307 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002); and (2) whether the statute passes muster
under a “discriminatory impact” theory of equal protection jurisprudence, as
outlined in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977). ER 25-30. After reviewing those cases, the district court granted
summary judgment, sua sponte, to the State on Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.
The district court did not consider any other theory of equal protection
jurisprudence.
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The Desegregation Case: In A Separate But Parallel Action, the
District Court Requires Culturally Relevant Courses

Parallel to this case, the District Court of Arizona has continued to exercise
jurisdiction over the federal consent decree requiring TUSD to achieve unitary
status (the Desegregation Case). On July 19, 2011, a month after Superintendent
Huppenthal ordered TUSD to eliminate its MAS program, the Ninth Circuit ruled
in the Desegregation Case that TUSD had not yet “eliminated the vestiges of racial
discrimination.” Fisher, 652 F.3d at 1140. Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
the district court adopted the parties’ stipulated Unitary Status Plan (“USP”) on
February 2, 2013. Deseg. Order at 4-5.
In adopting the USP, the court pointed out that the plan is designed “to
improve the academic achievement and educational outcomes of [TUSD’s] African
American and Latino students, using strategies aimed at closing the achievement
gap and eliminating the racial and ethnic disparities for these students in academic
achievement, dropout and retention rates, discipline, [and] access to advanced
learning experiences.” Id. at 12. To achieve this goal, the plan requires the
adoption of “culturally responsive teaching methods” and “culturally relevant
courses of instruction designed to reflect the history, experiences, and culture of
African American and Mexican American communities.” Id. at 12-13.
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Not a party to the Desegregation Case, the State filed an amicus brief and a
motion to intervene focused on “the sole question of whether the USP may include
a provision allowing the return of the discontinued [MAS] courses.” Id. at 5. The
State objected to the USP’s requirement that TUSD offer ethnic studies courses on
the grounds that “there is a real possibility that the supporters of the illegal, biased,
political, and emotionally charged MAS program that promoted social and political
activism against ‘white people’ and fomented racial resentment, will have used a
federal court-sanctioned avenue to resurrect this illegal course of instruction.” Id.
at 14.
The court denied the State’s motion to intervene. It first pointed out that the
“State does not dispute the merits of culturally relevant courses to improve
academic achievement for minority students.” Id. at 15. It also noted that the
court’s appointed “Special Master concluded that both studies [Cambium and
Cabrera] suggest that students who took the MAS courses were more likely to
graduate from high school on time and to pass state achievement tests than
similarly situated peers.” Id. at 15. The court further explained that the State
objected only to the MAS program, not the other ethnic studies courses, even
though the USP does not “adopt[] any specific culturally relevant course.” In

-1283318-0001/LEGAL28479297.1

Case: 13-15657

11/25/2013

ID: 8877119

DktEntry: 21-2

Page: 18 of 42

other words, the State objected to any MAS course, regardless of its compliance
with A.R.S. § 15-112, but did not object to other similar courses.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment, Sua
Sponte, to the State on Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claims
Because It Failed to Consider an Animus Theory of Equal
Protection.

This Court should vacate the district court’s summary judgment order
because that court only considered two equal protection theories (political structure
and discriminatory impact), while failing to consider a separate theory altogether:
animus. Animus can be described as “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group.” U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
State action motivated by animus toward any group—even if it is not a
traditionally protected group—violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. See United States v. Windsor, -- U.S. --, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693
(2013) (concluding that Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional, in part,
because the law was motivated by animus).
The summary judgment standard is particularly relevant here. As explained
below, the record viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs demonstrates that
A.R.S. § 15-112 effectively creates two classes of persons for purposes of
approving ethnic studies programs: one class is composed of those associated with
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the Tucson MAS program, including current and former MAS students, parents,
and faculty (“MAS community”); the other class consists of those individuals
associated with the other ethnic studies and other programs (i.e., current and
former students, parents, and faculty associated with African American Studies,
Pan Asian Studies, or Native American Studies). In practical effect, the law took
away the first group’s ethnic studies program, leaving the others’ ethnic studies
programs intact. The State’s subsequent enforcement actions—which carved out
the MAS program for special treatment, superseding the TUSD school board, its
own audit, and a separate independent study—reinforce the notion that the law
targeted Tucson’s MAS community.
Resolving all factual disputes and drawing all reasonable inferences for
Plaintiffs—as the summary judgment standard requires—the record strongly
suggests that animus motivated the passage and enforcement of A.R.S. § 15-112.
Because the district court never considered this theory this Court should vacate the
summary judgment order so that the parties can fully brief this claim and resolve
the factual disputes underlying it.
B.

Laws Motivated by Animus Violate the Equal Protection Clause

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that
no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
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laws.” U.S. const., amend. XIV. The Clause essentially directs that all persons
similarly situated be treated alike. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
The general rule is that a legislative classification will be sustained if it is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533. This
general rule “gives way, however, when the statute classifies by race, alienage, or
national origin,” because these factors “are so seldom relevant to the achievement
of any legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Laws based on these so-called “suspect classifications” are
subjected to strict scrutiny, which requires that they be “suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.” Id.
But even where the legislative classification does not deal with a “suspect
class,” courts will find that a law violates equal protection principles if there is
evidence that animus against a particular group motivated the law’s enactment or
enforcement. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. Because a law that burdens a
particular group for its own sake is never rational, animus-based laws fail even the
most deferential level of scrutiny. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
Courts apply a two-step test to determine whether state action was
unconstitutionally motivated by animus. First, a court will determine whether
there is evidence that the state acted with a desire to harm a certain group.
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Moreno, 413 U.S. at 434 (striking down legislation indirectly targeting “hippies”).
Several factors inform this determination such as (a) whether the legislative history
suggests that animus against this group motivated the law, see Romer, 517 U.S. at
624; (b) whether the state action was consistent with popular bias against this
group, see id.; and (c) whether the state action treated similarly situated groups
differently, see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
Second, having identified animus against a particular group, the court will
then closely examine the state’s purported interest in drawing the classication to
determine whether that interest is legitimate, and whether the state’s actions are
rationally related to accomplishing those interests. See id. at 449; Moreno, 413
U.S. at 534-35. By requiring some rational relationship between the classification
caused by state action and the purported legislative end, the court “ensures that
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened
by the law.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
Applying the animus framework here, alongside the summary judgment
standard, there are at least two factual disputes material to such an equal protection
claim:
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1. Whether the State’s actions—in passing and selectively enforcing the
law— were designed specifically to target the one group actually
burdened by the law: Tucson’s MAS community; and
2. Whether those actions are rationally related to accomplishing
legitimate interests.
As explained below, the leading Supreme Court precedents on animus
(Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer) each demonstrate that if the district court had
resolved those factual disputes in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs would have prevailed
at the summary judgment stage on an animus claim.
C.

The State’s Actions Were Motivated By Animus

Ultimately, every state program (or programmatic change to an existing
program) draws some classification, often between those who benefit from it and
those who are burdened by it. In most cases, these classifications are
constitutional. But a classification motivated by a “bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group” can never be rational or constitutional. Romer, 517
U.S. at 634. Here, the State violated the Equal Protection Clause by enacting and
enforcing A.R.S. § 15-112 in a manner that reflected animus against one group:
Tucson’s MAS community.
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The state actions in this case—enactment and enforcement—are two sides of
the same coin: a statute whose enactment was motivated by animus violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, even if that statute is facially neutrally, Moreno, 413 U.S.
at 538; likewise, animus-motivated enforcement of an otherwise neutral law also
violates the Equal Protection Clause, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74
(1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the constitution.”). Taken together, a state cannot do
through enforcement what it could not do through enactment (and vice versa).
Here, the district court focused on whether the State’s actions discriminated against
the “Latino population,” including “Latino students, teachers, or community
members.” ER 29. But the court never examined whether, regardless of race, the
State acted with animus toward Tucson’s MAS community, even though the
district court acknowledged that “the evidence indicates that Defendants targeted
the MAS program.” Id.
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Once again, applying the proper summary judgment standard by resolving
all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences for Plaintiffs, the following facts
establish that unconstitutional animus motivated the State’s actions:
1. Then-Superintendent Horne blamed the MAS community for insulting
his deputy after a few students staged a silent protest;
2. The legislative testimony in support of A.R.S. § 15-112 focused solely
on Tucson’s MAS program;
3. The State ordered Tucson’s MAS program investigated and
dismantled before A.R.S. § 15-112 went into effect;
4. The State ignored its own audit (the Cambium Report), which
concluded that the MAS program promoted student achievement and
did not violate A.R.S. § 15-112;
5. The State disregarded TUSD’s own data, and the Special Master’s
separate study (the Cabrera Report), each of which showed that the
MAS program dramatically improved student achievement;
6. Rather than attempt to fix the program, the State completely
dismantled it, and has aggressively sought to prevent any other MAS
program from taking root;
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7. The State has not investigated any other program even though it has
admitted that other programs may also violate the law;
8. The State has treated other similarly situated communities differently,
such as the Anglo American,1 African American, Asian American,
and Native American studies programs; and
9. As documented in the Desegregation Case, TUSD had a long history
of racial discrimination, particularly against Hispanic students.
Considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, this record suggests that
unconstitutional animus against Tucson’s MAS community motivated the State’s
actions. Because animus is not a legitimate state interest, the Court erred in
granting summary judgment to Defendants.
D.

The State’s Actions Were Not Rationally Related to Any
Legitimate Purpose

Because the State’s actions singled out Tucson’s MAS community, the
question is whether that classification’s “relationship to [any] asserted goal is so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary and irrational.” Cleburne, 473 U.S.
at 446. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer
1

Mainstream or traditional history, literature, and cultural studies programs that focus on the
accomplishments of Anglo and other European Americans must be included as ethnic studies
courses subject to the restrictions of A.R.S. § 15-112. If the term “ethnic” does not include
Anglo and European Americans, it is difficult to see how there can be any dispute that the statute
discriminates on its face.
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demonstrate that the State’s actions are not rationally related to accomplishing
legitimate interests, and fail even the most deferential scrutiny.
1.

U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno

Moreno, one of three leading Supreme Court precedents on animus, is
particularly instructive here. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In Moreno, the Supreme Court
considered the practical and intended effect of Congress’s decision to amend the
Food Stamp Act of 1964 to deny food stamps to any household containing an
individual who is unrelated to any other member of the household. Id. at 529. The
Court began by observing that the amendment created two classes of persons for
food stamp purposes: “one class is composed of those individuals who live in
households all of whose members are related to one another, and the other class
consists of those individuals who live in households containing one or more
members who are unrelated to the rest.” Id. Because the law did not create a
“suspect” classification, the question for the Court was whether the law created “an
irrational classification in violation of the equal protection [clause].” Id. at 532-33.
Noting that the classification was “irrelevant to the stated purposes of the
Act,” which was to provide nutrition among low-income households, the Court
determined that the amendment was actually intended “to prevent so-called
‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the food stamp program.”
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Id. at 534. The Court reasoned that animus towards hippies could not sustain the
act because “if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate purpose.” Id.
The government nevertheless tried to save the amendment by arguing that the
classification was rationally related to other legitimate interests, such as preventing
fraud. Id. The Court rejected these other interests because they were based on
unsubstantiated assumptions, and because denying food stamps to otherwise
eligible households did not constitute “a rational effort” to deal with those
concerns. Having determined that Congress was motivated by animus against a
particular group (i.e., hippies), the Court concluded that the Food Stamp
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 537.
Like the Food Stamp Act, the legislative history and selective enforcement
of A.R.S. § 15-112 against only Tucson’s MAS program show that the State was
motivated by unconstitutional animus toward Tucson’s MAS community. For
instance, as the district court acknowledged, the legislative testimony focused
exclusively on the MAS program, even though the State concedes that other
programs (e.g., African American Studies) might also violate the act. The State
dismisses any notion of selective enforcement by claiming it is simply responding
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to complaints about the MAS program. See ER 28. But the State cannot “avoid
the strictures of [the Equal Protection Clause] by deferring to the wishes or
objections of some fraction of the body politic.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
See also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly give them
effect.”). Moreover, the extent to which the State is responding to complaints,
rather than enforcing a policy based on animus, is a question of fact that cannot be
resolved at the summary judgment stage.
Additionally, like the government in Moreno, here the State has attempted to
identify other legitimate purposes of A.R.S. § 15-112 to show that the State was
not motivated by animus. But the State’s actions are not rationally related to these
other interests. Most importantly, A.R.S. § 15-112 is clearly not relevant to the
underlying purposes of public education. The MAS program was created to
promote student achievement amongst traditionally low-performing populations
like Hispanics and African Americans. And by all accounts, the MAS program
worked: increasing test scores, graduation rates, and overall student achievement
for students enrolled in the program. While the State may disagree with the
Cambium Audit and the Cabrera Report on this issue, the standard at summary
judgment requires the Court to resolve all factual disputes and draw all reasonable
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inferences for Plaintiffs. Therefore, the State’s actions—singling out Tucson’s
MAS community like Congress singled out “hippies” in Moreno—cannot be
justified by reference to other educational goals.
The State has asserted that ending the MAS program served another interest:
ending racial resentment. But like the government’s purported interests in Moreno,
the State’s assertions are based on “wholly unsubstantiated assumptions
concerning the differences between [those associated with the MAS program and
those associated with other ethnic studies programs].” Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535.
The State cannot argue that the MAS program is materially different than any other
ethnic studies program, because the legislature and Superintendent have focused
exclusively on the MAS community. Moreover, the State even admitted that other
programs violate the law, but none have been investigated, much less shut down.
ER 28. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the evidence shows that
the State’s actions were not motivated by a general purpose to end racial
resentment, but instead were motivated by animus against Tucson’s MAS
community.
Even if the State’s assumptions about the MAS program are true, the State’s
decision to eliminate MAS wholesale—rather than reform it—did not “constitute a
rational effort to deal with these concerns” and further demonstrate the State’s
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animus. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 536. Just like the Food Stamp Act had separate
provisions to address fraud, here the State had other safeguards to ensure that the
MAS program did not run afoul of state standards. The TUSD school board had
authority to review and amend the program, and after concluding that the program
did not violate A.R.S. § 15-112, the board voted 4-1 to maintain the program. The
Superintendent’s own audit reached the same conclusion. ER 2198. The existence
of these other safeguards, juxtaposed with the program’s documented success,
“necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that [A.R.S. § 15-112]
could rationally have been intended to prevent those very same abuses.” Moreno,
413 U.S. at 537.
Thus, taken together and applying the correct summary judgment standard,
the State’s actions cannot be justified by reference to Arizona’s general interest in
promoting student achievement (because it affirmatively dismantled a program that
increased test scores and graduation rates), or by reference to the amendment’s
other purported interests (because eliminating the program altogether was irrational
and based on unsubstantiated assumptions). Instead, the record shows that
unconstitutional animus against Tucson’s MAS community motivated the passage
and enforcement of A.R.S. § 15-112.
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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center

Like this case, Cleburne involved a challenge to a state action that included
both the adoption of a law and its enforcement. The ordinance in Cleburne
required a “special use permit” for certain multi-unit projects, including
“[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. 473 U.S. at 436 (citation omitted).
The plaintiff, Cleburne Living Center (“CLC”), had leased a building in Cleburne
intending to operate a group home for individuals with intellectual disabilities. Id.
at 435. The City classified the proposed group home as a “hospital for the feebleminded,” and required a special use permit—which the City then denied. Id. at
436-37. The question for the Court was whether “the city [may] require the permit
for this facility when other care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely
permitted.” Id. at 448. Or, put differently, “whether it is rational to treat the
mentally retarded differently.” Id. at 449.
The Court considered the City’s specific objections to the CLC facility—
including its fear that students from a nearby school might harass the occupants,
that the facility would be located on a flood plain, and the facility’s proposed
size—rejecting each because none were rational reasons to treat intellectually
disabled persons differently. Id. 449-50. The Court identified two primary reasons
for concluding that the zoning classification between the mentally disabled and all
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other residents was not rational: (1) the classification was the result of irrational
fear and animus, and (2) the City did not impose the same hardships on other
groups that posed the same alleged problems. Specifically, the Court noted that
denying CLC the permit based on “vague, undifferentiated fears is again
permitting some portion of the community to validate what would otherwise be an
equal protection violation.” Id. It also concluded that there was no evidence that
“the characteristics of the intended occupants [of the banned home] rationally
justify denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying
the same site for different purposes.” Id. at 450. The Court then struck down
Cleburne’s ordinance.
The state action at issue in Cleburne is parallel to the state action in this
case. Like the Cleburne City Council’s decision to require CLC to apply for—and
then deny—a special use permit, here the Superintendent decided to investigate
and then dismantle only one program: the one belonging to the Tucson MAS
community. The Court’s reasoning in Cleburne illustrates why the State’s actions
here are not rationally related to any legitimate purpose.
First, like the City Council’s motivations in Cleburne, the record here
suggests that the State’s concerns reflect “the negative attitude of the majority of
[legislators and some complainants].” Id. These negative attitudes “or fear[s],
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unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable . . . are not permissible
bases for treating a [program] for the [Mexican American community] differently
from [programs for other ethnicities or communities].” Id. Rather than focusing
on concrete evidence—such as the Superintendent’s own audit or the TUSD
Board’s vote in favor of MAS—the State instead cited anecdotal complaints,
thereby “deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic.”
Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the State’s objections here are not rational
reasons to treat the MAS community differently but are instead based on “vague,
undifferentiated fears.” Id. The State cannot so easily “avoid the strictures” of the
Equal Protection Clause. Id.
Second, like the apartment dwellings that would otherwise have been
permitted under Cleburne’s ordinance, other ethnic studies programs have been
“freely permitted” to continue, even though State officials have admitted that these
other programs might also violate the law. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. In fact,
based on the State’s own reasoning, all of TUSD’s ethnic studies programs
probably violate the proscription in A.R.S. § 15-112 against courses “primarily
designed for one ethnic group.” For instance, the African American Studies
program is designed to “improve[] the academic achievement of African American
students and promote[] cultural sensitivity throughout the TUSD community,” and
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its “primary focus is African American students.” See Tucson Unified School
District, “African American Student Services,” available at
http://tusd1.org/contents/depart/aastudies/index.asp (last visited: Oct. 12, 2013)
(emphasis added). See also “Asian Pacific American Student Services,” available
at http://tusd1.org/contents/depart/panasian/mission.asp (last visited: Oct. 12,
2013) (noting that one service the program provides is to “advocate on behalf of all
API [Asian Pacific Islander] students and families) (emphasis added); “Native
American Student Services,” available at
http://tusd1.org/contents/depart/Native/aboutus.asp (last visited: Oct. 12, 2013)
(explaining that the program was established “to meet the unique educational and
culturally related academic needs of American Indian and Alaska Natives
enrolled in TUSD schools so that they can achieve the same challenging state
standards as all students”) (emphasis added).
Although these other programs are similarly designed for one ethnic group,
none have been investigated or targeted like MAS. Thus, as in Cleburne, the key
question is whether the classification the State necessarily draws—between the
MAS community and the other ethnic studies communities—is “rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose.” Id. at 446. Like the differences between
CLC’s facility and an apartment building, there is no evidence that MAS
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“threaten[s] legitimate interests of the [State] in a way that other permitted
[programs] . . . would not.” Id. at 448.
3.

Romer v. Evans

The Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), provides
additional support for the notion that the State’s actions had no rational
relationship to a legitimate interest. Romer concerned an amendment to the
Colorado constitution that repealed all local antidiscrimination laws based on
sexual orientation, and prevented local jurisdictions from enacting future laws to
protect sexual minorities. Id. As the Court observed, the amendment “withdraws
from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused
by discrimination.” Id. at 627. In short, the State’s action “impose[d] a special
disability” upon one group alone. Id. at 631.
After outlining the law’s effects, the Court concluded that the Colorado
amendment violated equal protection because it was not rationally related to
legitimate state interests. Id. at 632. The Court reasoned that the amendment was
“at once too narrow and too broad” because it “identifie[d] persons by a single trait
and then denie[d] them protection across the board.” Id. at 633. The state cited
two interests served by the amendment: citizens’ freedom of association to object
to homosexuality, and conserving state resources to fight discrimination against
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other groups. Id. at 635. The Court rejected both because the law was “so far
removed from these particular justifications that [it was] impossible to credit
them.” Id. Given that the law imposed a special disability on “a politically
unpopular group,” and that it was not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, the Court found an “inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed
[was] born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.” Id. at 634-35 (citing
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). The Court struck down the law, concluding that the
amendment was “a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake,
something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.” Id. at 635-36.
The Court’s reasoning in Romer provides strong support for an animusbased equal protection claim against the State’s action here. First, like the law in
Romer, the State’s actions have both retrospective and prospective effects: the
State not only dismantled a program that had been established to address
discrimination within TUSD (like the local ordinances that Colorado’s amendment
repealed), but also made it difficult—if not impossible—to reestablish any
semblance of an MAS program in the future. In fact, in its motion to intervene in
the Desegregation Case, the State cites its own decision to dismantle the MAS
program in support of its objection to including any new MAS program in the
Unitary Status Plan.
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Second, like the law in Romer, the State action here has no rational
relationship to a legitimate interest because “[i]t is at once too narrow and too
broad.” Id. at 633. Specifically, the State—by passing and enforcing A.R.S. § 15112—identified Tucson’s MAS community “by a single trait and then denie[d] [it]
protection across the board.” Id. There is no evidence in the record that the State
worked with the Tucson MAS community to reform the program or to remove only
those parts that violated the A.R.S. § 15-112. Instead, the State abolished the MAS
community’s ethnic studies program wholesale.
Third, the State “withdraws from [the MAS community], but no others” an
ethnic studies program that had been designed to address “injuries caused by
discrimination.” Id. at 627. Specifically, the State has dismantled a program that
was designed to help desegregate Tucson’s schools and close the achievement gap
for traditionally low-performing Hispanic students. For the community that had
been benefitting from the MAS program’s success in increasing test scores and
graduation rates, this is a “severe consequence.” Id. at 639. Moreover, like the
law in Romer, there is a glaring “absence of precedent” for a law like A.R.S. § 15112, which itself is a strong signal that the law is “obnoxious to the constitutional
provision.” Id. at 633. Thus, like the amendment targeting sexual minorities, the
State “imposes a special disability” upon group alone. Id. at 631.
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Here, the State’s actions, which narrowly targeted one group with a unique
and peculiar law, and which were not rationally related to a legitimate interest, give
way to an inference of animus that is far more direct, but no less inevitable than the
law in Romer. As in Romer, the record here suggests that A.R.S. § 15-112 was
drawn and enforced explicitly to classify the intended target—the MAS
community—for its own sake, “something the Equal Protection Clause does not
permit.” Id. at 636.
V.

CONCLUSION
The Court’s decisions in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer, provide the basic

framework for determining when a state action was motivated by unconstitutional
animus. Here, the State enacted and enforced a law with one group in mind: the
MAS community in Tucson. Once passed, the law was used to harm its intended
target, thereby making this group unequal to other similarly situated groups. This
Arizona cannot do. While the State may disagree with this interpretation of the
facts, it is nevertheless the version that should have prevailed at summary
judgment. If the Plaintiffs’ factual assertions are correct, then A.R.S. § 15-112
cannot be reconciled with the Equal Protection Clause.
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